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How should revenues from natural
resources be shared in Indonesia?
Roy Bahl and Bayar Tumennasan

INTRODUCTION
The share of 'mining and quarrying' in GDP is quite large in a number of
countries, above 10 percent in 29 of 100 countries for which we could find
data and accounting for more than one-fifth of GDP in 13 countries. 1 The
share in Indonesia is especially large. At 10.1 percent, Indonesia's share is
about five times higher than the international median. Of the countries in the
East Asian region, only Mongolia and Papua New Guinea are more heavily
dependent on natural resources than is Indonesia.
As we document later, we find that countries with larger mining shares
tend to delegate more spending power to local governments. One possible
explanation for this is that the pressures to devolve some of the rents ex
tracted from the natural resource sector are irresistible. Based on our
cross-section evidence, we can say that if the mining share of GDP is higher in
one country than another by 100 percent (i.e. it is 20 percent versus 10 percent
of GDP), the expected local government expenditure share will be higher by 13
percent. However, based on its mining share, per capita GDP, population and
land area, Indonesia's local government expenditure share in the 1990s was
14.4 points below the expected level. 2 The 'Big Bang' decentralization of
2001 brought Indonesia close to the expected level, but the share of local
government expenditure remains lower than in similarly situated countries.
The arguments for sharing natural resource revenues with regions are often
based on political notions of fairness, and are almost always emotionally
charged. The problem is even more complicated in Indonesia because the
revenue sharing argument is confounded by the ethnic and cultural differ
ences between the natural resource regions and the rest of Indonesia. Clearly,
however, there are objective arguments, both in support of and against giving
sub-national governments a claim on a share of these revenues. On the one
hand, these payments may be seen as compensation for the economic and
social costs of natural resource extraction; a share of natural resource rev
enues may also be justified as payment for using up an exhaustible resource;
199
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that is, for replacing the heritage of the region. On the other hand, some policy
analysts and political leaders argue against natural resource revenue sharing,
largely on the basis that it is the national government that is assumed to 'own'
the natural riches; also, there is a concern about tying the finance of essential
local government-provided services to an unstable revenue flow, and a fear that
local governments could not efficiently spend such a large revenue windfall.
Few policy analysts or politicians believe that there should be no natural
resource revenue sharing. One important issue relates to the magnitude of the
share. In addition, there is much debate in Indonesia on whether - and how natural resource revenue sharing should affect the transfer of general revenue
sharing from the DAU. There are also concerns that local governments with
large mining sectors will make unwise use of windfall revenues and that
these governments will rely too heavily on the financing of essential local
services with an unstable flow from natural resource industries. There are few
generally accepted answers to these questions.
The objective in this chapter is to evaluate the system of sharing natural
resource revenue in Indonesia against the criteria that are most often discussed
in international forums. The chapter has three parts. First, we examine the
importance of the issue and try to place the practice in Indonesia in some
comparative perspective. Second, we argue the case for and against decentrali
zation of revenues raised from natural resources and consider the constraints to
such a decentralization policy. Third, we examine the reform options in terms
of the specific fiscal instruments that might be used. This research is explora
tory and does not delve into the detail of the complicated system of mineral
taxation and of the present system of natural resource revenue sharing in
Indonesia. Only a few Indonesian scholars have addressed this subject, and we
cannot find a comprehensive government policy paper on the subject. 3

IMPORTANCE OF THE ISSUE
Natural resources constitute a great source of wealth in many developing
economies. As may be seen from the data in Appendix A9.1 and from the
frequency distribution in Table 9.1, the share of 'mining and quarrying' in
GDP is above 10 percent in 29 of 100 countries for which we could find data,
and accounts for more than one-fifth of GDP in 13 of these countries.4
Indonesia's mining share is 10.1 percent, about five times higher than the
international median. Of the countries in the East Asian region only Mongo
lia and Papua New Guinea are more heavily dependent on natural resources
than is Indonesia.
We also examine the 'connection' between the share of mining in GDP and
selected fiscal variables. We ask two questions. Do the countries that rely
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Table 9.1
Percent

Mining share as a percent of GDP in selected countries•
Number of countries

10 or less
11-20
21-30
31-40
41-50
Above 51
Note:
Source:
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71
16
7
5
1
0

• Average for the period 1990-99.
National Accounts Statistics, The United Nations.

more heavily on natural resource production show a greater ratio of tax
revenue to GDP? Do the countries that rely more heavily on natural resource
production choose more or less decentralized fiscal structures?
With respect to the first question, one might expect a positive relationship
between the tax ratio and the mining share of GDP. This is especially true in
developing countries where there are relatively fewer 'tax handles' to reach
for. The mining sector is visible, relatively easily reached with the existing
tax administration apparatus, and offers a lucrative revenue take. Bahl (1971)
found that there was a significant, positive relationship between the mining
share and the tax ratio in the 1960s.
We estimate a log-linear regression of the determinants of the tax ratio to
GDP using the independent variables that have become standard in tax effort
analysis: per capita GDP, the agriculture share of GDP, the level of openness
of trade, land area and population size. We also introduce the mining share of
GDP as an independent variable. The result of this analysis, reported in Table
9.2 for various specifications, is that we can find no significant relationship
between the tax ratio and the mining share for the 1990s. When we specify
the dependent variable as the revenue ratio, to include all tax and non-tax
revenues of the consolidated government, we get the same result. One expla
nation for this is that other tax bases have emerged as economies have
developed, and there is less reliance on the extractive sector. This finding is
also consistent with the hypothesis that revenues raised from the natural
resource base and those raised from other bases are substitutes. We find
evidence of such substitution in Indonesia, and discuss this later.
The second question is whether countries that rely more heavily on the
natural resource sector tend to be more or less decentralized. There is ambi
guity here about what one should expect. One might hypothesize more

�

Table 9.2

Regression analysis of the level of taxation, revenue and decentralization against selected independent variables•

Dependent variable:
Intercept
GDP per capita
Mining share of GDP
Agricultural share of GDP

Tax Ratiob

1.18
(5.90)***
0.24
(9.61)***
-0.02
(-0.87)

Revenue Ratioc

2.06
(6.55)***
0.17
(4.79)***
-0.05
(-1.70)

Openness0
W
W

Area

Tax Ratio•

3.41
(7.63)***
0.001
(0.06)
-0.25
(-5.04)
0.07
(0.70)

Population
Estimation method
Number of observations
Adj R2

-

OLS

81
0.54

OLS

41
0.46

OLS

68
0.27

Tax Ratio"

2.39
(2.84)***

-0.29
(-8.08)***
0.21
(2.18)***

Decentralizationd

-4.71
(-3.58)***
0.30
(4.35)***
0.13
(2.14)***

0.03
(1.03)

0.11
(1.55)
0.20
(2.16)***

OLS

OLS

112
0.43

62
0.37

Notes:

***,**,*denote significance at 1%,5%,and 10%levels, respectively. t-statistics are shown in parentheses.
Data are averages for the years 1990-99.
Tax revenue as a share of GDP.
Total government revenue as a share of GDP.
Sub-national government share of total government expenditure.
e
Sum of export and import shares of GDP.
a

C

Sources:

World Development Indicators, T he World Bank; National Accounts Statistics, The United Nations; Government Finance Statistics, Inter

national Monetary Fund.

How should revenues from natural resources be shared in Indonesia?

203

centralization. The revenue stakes are high, and countries that can tap natural
resources for supporting central government expenditures can avoid impos
ing high general tax rates on the voting public. Central government officials,
and parliaments, might be loath to give up this natural advantage. There are
issues of political control over these resources that might discourage decen
tralization of governance. Finally, there are questions of corruption that might
point to more centralization: both the central control over mining concessions
and the fear of corruption associated with large sums of money passing
through local government budgets.
On the other hand, natural resource wealth is not evenly distributed within
countries, and those regions that house this natural wealth are likely to
clamor for a larger and dedicated share of the returns. Debate over the
sharing of natural resource wealth can seriously threaten national unity. This
will push countries with more natural resource wealth towards a larger degree
of decentralization.
We use a cross-country panel of data to test for a relationship between the
mining share and expenditure decentralization. In Table 9.2, we present the
results of a regression analysis of the determinants of decentralization, based
on some other work in progress (Alm, Bahl and Tumennasan, 2002.) We can
explain about 40 percent of the variation on the degree of decentralization
across 62 countries, with per capita GDP, population, area and the mining
share of GDP as significant explanatory variables. Countries with greater de
pendence on the mining sector, ceteris paribus, tend to be more decentralized.5
In summary, we cannot conclude that countries with larger mining shares
raise more revenues to distribute among the various levels of government, but
we do find that countries with larger mining shares tend to delegate more
spending power to local governments. Apparently the pressures to devolve
some of the rents extracted from the natural resource sector are irresistible.
Based on this cross-section, we can say that if the mining share of GDP is
higher in one country than another by 100 percent (i.e. it is 20 percent versus
10 percent GDP), the expected local government expenditure share will be
higher by 13 percent. W hen one remembers that the average sub-national
government share of expenditures is only about 17 percent, this may be seen
as a fairly large response. It is of some interest that, based on its mining
share, per capita GDP, population and land area, Indonesia's local govern
ment expenditure share in the 1990s was 14.4 points below the expected
level.6 The decentralization of 2001 brought Indonesia close to the expected
level: based on our estimation results, one could speculate that the nearly 10
percent mining share of GDP in Indonesia played some role in moving the
government toward this more decentralized structure.
A related question that might be raised is the potential of natural resource
revenues for financing local governments; that is, is the amount of money at
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issue significant in terms of the expenditure needs of local governments? Put
differently, how important can the sharing of revenues from natural resources
be in the intergovernmental fiscal system? This is not meant to be a normative
question, but rather a query about why local governments around the world
look with so much interest on this question.
In Appendix A9.l, we report the results of a hypothetical calculation. For
countries for which we have data, we have calculated the amount of revenue
that would flow if 10 percent of the mining share of GDP were allocated to
the sub-national governments. The allocation would take the form of a shared
tax of this amount or a direct allocation from central government. The ratio
we report in column (5) is this 10 percent mining share as a percent of the
actual expenditures of sub-national governments. For example, we find in
Indonesia that, if 10 percent of all the GDP generated in 'mining and quarry
ing' sector were allocated to sub-national governments, this would be
equivalent to 43 percent of local government expenditures (in the 1990s)
(Appendix A9.1). T he distribution of this revenue potential among the 35
countries shown in Table 9.3, suggests that in five countries, the 10 percent
share would be sufficient to cover one-half of local government expenditures.
Table 9.3

The potential of the natural resource sector as a source of
financing decentralized governance•

Percent
10 or less
11-20
21-30
31-50
51-100
101 or more

Number of countries
25
2
1
2
2
3

Note: • 10 percent of the mining share of GDP divided by sub-national government expendi
tures; average for the period 1990-99.
Sources: National Accounts Statistics, The United Nations; Government Finance Statistics,
International Monetary Fund.
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THE CASE FOR SHARING NATURAL RESOURCE
REVENUES
The arguments for sharing natural resource revenues with regions are often
based on political notions of fairness, and are almost always emotionally
charged. The problem is even more complicated in Indonesia because the
revenue sharing argument is confounded by ethnic differences in the natural
resource regions. There are, in fact, objective arguments in support of giving
sub-national governments a claim on a share of these revenues. We examine
those arguments here, and then turn to the counter arguments in the next
section.

The 'Heritage' Argument
Natural resource endowments are sometimes seen as the 'heritage' of the
region. Unlike the beauty of Bali or the deep water port at Medan, these
resources are exhaustible. The returns from fertile land in a region may be
taxed in perpetuity; in contrast, natural resource regions may tax the returns
from an exhaustible resource only over the finite life of the resource. Clearly
the flow of tax entitlements from the exhaustible resource will be more front
loaded. To outside or casual observers, this front-loaded flow might be seen
as exorbitant. To residents of the natural resource region, however, it may be
seen as a payment for selling their heritage.
The region can make a strong claim on the returns from this natural
endowment. McLure says it nicely: 'Sub-national governments have argued
strongly that they may have the right to tax natural resources located within
their boundaries, to convert resource wealth (their "heritage") into financial
capital' - to tum 'oil in the ground into money in the bank' (1994, p. 199).
Link (1978) also reports a well-stated view of the sub-national governments,
by the Governor of the US state of North Dakota regarding the justification of
a severance tax as 'just compensation for losing forever a one-time harvest.'
The heritage argument has found acceptance around the world. As we
show in Appendix A9.3, countries that decentralize in fact share natural
resource revenues with their regional governments. The tougher question is
'Who owns the natural resources?', which gives rise to the lightning rod
question, 'How much of the rents from natural resources ought to be de
volved to local governments?'

The Cost Reimbursement Argument
There is also a cost reimbursement argument for natural resource revenue
sharing (McLure, 1994). Natural resource extraction and processing can be a
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'dirty business,' imposing both high social costs and high infrastructure costs.
Oil and natural gas drilling and processing can pollute the environment and
impose social costs as well as clean-up costs on the community. Harvesting
timber and various kinds of mining can impose real costs of restoring the
land to its initial condition, or social costs if the land is not restored. Though
companies bear some of these costs, they do not bear all of them, hence there
is a case for revenue sharing.
There is as well an infrastructure cost. Most natural resource extraction
activity requires the provision of infrastructure facilities that must be con
structed and maintained. These might include such things as roads, public
utilities, port facilities and the like. The 'settlement costs' of servicing the
larger population of workers, and perhaps a different mix of new citizens,
might also impose additional pressure on budgets (e.g. education, clinics, law
enforcement, general community services). Finally, there is a cost associated
with hosting a population that is possibly 'different' and has behavior pat
terns that are far from the local culture. Required technical expertise and
required capital investment make it unlikely that natural resource industries
will be owned, managed, and operated solely by the local population. Some
also see this cultural incursion as a social cost to the host community.

Rationalizing the Revenue Structure
Another advantage of formally decentralizing natural resource revenues may
not be as obvious. Indonesia is decentralizing, and local governments are
taking on new expenditure responsibilities and looking for new revenue op
portunities. Giving them a share of natural resources revenue, by some
transparent formulae, will forestall their looking for 'back door' approaches
to revenue raising. These 'back door' approaches can be quite harmful to
economic development, by discouraging investors and driving up transaction
costs.
The informal approach to revenue raising will almost certainly lead local
governments to the natural resource sector. The mining sector would be a
good target for informal taxes, because it is a visible sector and because of
the perception that the tax is exported to foreigners. There is a history of local
governments using informal taxes when transparent approaches (e.g. formal
local taxing power or transfer entitlements) are not part of the intergovern
mental system. Chinese local governments have made heavy use of such
taxes and fees and then allocated them to off-budget accounts (Bahl, 1999).
In the first year of decentralization, Indonesian local governments imposed
numerous ad hoc taxes that were discriminatory against activities where the
perception was that the burden could be exported. The so-called business
(registration) tax is an example of such a tax. It is imposed on businesses
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based on their size, usually proxied by their installed power capacity, and
thus it is discriminatory against manufacturing industries. However, it does
not create serious political problems, because the tax burden can be exported
(Simanjuntak, 2002).
Another response to a failure to allocate formal revenue raising powers to
local governments is that they may, by one means or another, confiscate some
of the natural resource rents for themselves. The Russian case is instructive
here. The division of natural resource taxation is clearly prescribed between
central, regional and local government levels. However, local governments
end up keeping a significantly larger share than their entitlement (Bosquet,
2002). Central government finds it difficult to enforce the sharing arrange
ments it has prescribed.
Politics and National Unity
The politics of natural resource revenue sharing may be on the side of a larger
regional government entitlement. The alternative - civil unrest and threatened
secession - may be far more costly. Certainly this has been an important issue
in the Russian Federation (McLure, 1994; Bosquet, 2002).

THE CASE AGAINST SHARING NATURAL RESOURCE
REVENUES
Despite these arguments, some policy analysts and political leaders make a
strong case against natural resource revenue sharing. A set of very solid
arguments lead this group to recommend a smaller revenue share for sub
national governments.
Revenue Stability
Natural resource revenues are inherently unstable, and, it is argued, the
provision of essential local government services should not be tied to an
unstable revenue stream. This seems a reasonable proposition. Central gov
ernments can accommodate such fluctuations because they can run deficits
and finance these with borrowings. They also can postpone large capital
projects. Deficit financing of current expenses is not an option that is, or
should be, open to local governments.
How unstable are natural resource revenues in Indonesia? In Figures 9.1 and
9.2, we describe the relative stability of the natural resource sector. In Figure
9.1, the distribution of GDP originating in the mining sector is considerably
more variable than the distribution of total GDP. In Figure 9.2, the instability of
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210

Closing the fiscal gap

oil tax revenues is much greater than that in other revenues in the Indonesian
financing structure. The revenue instability argument against natural resource
revenue sharing would appear to have considerable merit in Indonesia. Any
policy solution that ties revenue decentralization to natural resource tax rev
enues will require some feature that accommodates this instability.
Macroeconomic Considerations
Macroeconomic planning and growth considerations may dictate that rev
enues raised from natural resources be kept by central government. The
government deficit is estimated in the range of 3 percent of GDP for 2001
and 2002. Receipts from oil and gas revenues, estimated at about 2 percent of
GDP in these years, are essential for holding the deficit at this level. Without
a tax increase, even an allocation equivalent to the 26 percent of oil tax
revenues devolved in 2001 might be seen as threatening fiscal stability.
There also is a question about whether the devolution of natural resource
revenues would lead to a replacement of national government investment
priorities with local government investment priorities. Especially in the re
gions where natural resources are an important part of the economy, there are
significant amounts of resources involved; in aggregate, the distribution in
2001 was about 0.6 percent of GDP. The result of decentralization could be a
noticeable displacement of public investments.
Would this make any difference in the portfolios of investments? P resum
ably, national government officials plan infrastructure development according
to a development program, and take into account local, regional and national
benefits. Elected local government officials will be more prone to invest the
proceeds of natural resource sharing in more visible projects with benefits
weighted toward the very short run.
There also is the question of resource mobilization. Large amounts of
natural resource revenue sharing may discourage some districts from increas
ing their effort with respect to raising their own source local revenues. For a
country like Indonesia, with a low level of tax effort, this is a problem of
some importance.
Equalization
Natural resource endowments are unevenly distributed in nearly all countries.
For example, in Russia, about 10 percent of all metal production originates in
10 regions, and about half of all natural resource revenues are collected in
three regions (Bosquet, 2002). If revenues are shared among local govern
ments purely on a derivation basis, gross inequities in the revenue sharing
system will occur.
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The concentration of natural resource endowments is also the case in
Indonesia, and it almost certainly follows that any derivation-based distribu
tion will produce disparities in grant receipts. We study these disparities by
examining the per capita distribution of natural resource revenue sharing
across districts for 2001. One could evaluate this distribution of natural
resource revenues in two ways. The first is according to what the law pre
scribes, and the second is according to the actual amounts received.
The legal distribution of natural resource revenue is based primarily on tax
sharing, where specified percentages of the tax revenue raised from each
extractive activity are divided between central and local governments, with
different vertical shares for different components of the natural resource
sector. For example, in the case of oil, the sharing rate is 85/15 (i.e. 85
percent to central government and 15 percent to local governments); in the
case of natural gas, the sharing rate is 70/30. The actual base that is shared is
a more complicated story. By formal regulation, the distribution among local
governments is accomplished in two steps. First, a share goes to the local
government where the extraction takes place; second, a share goes to all
eligible jurisdictions in the province.
Does this method of distribution lead to inequities, and does it compromise
the equalization of the overall system of intergovernmental transfers? The
best way to answer this question is to study the actual revenue flows that
result from this set of laws and regulations. The actual distribution of per
capita natural resource revenue received by each district in 2001 shows an
extremely large range, from Rp 271.3 million to Rp 4.6 million. The distribu
tion of the per capita amounts received is summarized in the frequency
distribution in Table 9.4. The variation reported in this table is striking: about
an equal number of districts receive above Rp 1 million per capita as receive
less than Rp 1000 per capita. No matter what the justification for this gap,
and no matter that only about 10 percent of the districts are in the outlying
Table 9.4

Frequency distribution of per capita natural resource revenue
sharing across districts in 2001

Amounts (in Rp)
1000 or less
1001-10 000
10 001-100 000
100 001-1 000 000
Above 1 000 000
Source:

Number of districts
16
169
100
37
14

Government of Indonesia. http://www.djpkdp.go.id
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categories, such disparities are likely to bring popular attention and criticism
to the distribution.
Is this revenue sharing distribution out of step with the goals of the
government for promoting equity among the districts in Indonesia? The
regression results reported in Table 9.5 show an interesting pattern in the
determinants of per capita natural resource revenue sharing. Districts with a
higher per capita value added received more in per capita natural resource
revenue sharing. Districts with a higher concentration of poverty received
less, all other things held constant. Clearly, the distribution of natural re
source revenue sharing is not equalizing, if either per capita GDP or the
poverty rate is taken as the barometer of equalization. Interestingly, how
ever, the distribution of per capita natural resource revenue sharing was
positively and significantly related to the distribution of per capita DAU
Table 9.5

Regression analysis ofper capita natural resource revenue
sharing across the districts in Indonesia 3

Dependent variable

NRRSpcb

NRRSpcb

NRRSpcb

Intercept

19.68
(8.29)***
-0.24
(-1.61)*
-0.15
(-1.01)
-1.25
(-12.95)***

11.03
(4.90)***
- 0.52
(-3.82)***
0.26
(1.98)**
-1.25
(-14.83)***
0.50
(10.08)***

-2.85
(-18.25)***

Poverty
GPRPpc
Population
Area
DAUpc
Estimation method
Number of observations
Adj R2

OLS
336
0.33

OLS
336
0.49

1.81
(12.07)***
OLS
336
0.30

Notes:
***, **, * denote significance at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
t-statistics are shown in parentheses.
a
Data are for 2001.
b
Natural resource revenue transfer per capita.
Source:

Government of Indonesia: http://www.djkpkd.go.id
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(general purpose) transfers. The two transfer systems were reinforcing rather
than offsetting.
Recall, however, that there are those who argue that the question of equali
zation is the 'wrong' question. There is no reason why natural resource
revenue sharing should take on any particular pattern as regards the level of
income or poverty, nor is there any reason to be concerned about inequities
across regions in the distribution of these revenues. The purpose of this
revenue sharing program is to compensate natural resource regions for costs
incurred and for the use of exhaustible resources. Its distribution should be
driven only by those two factors.
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Windfalls and Inefficiency
The revenue gains to local governments from natural resource revenue
sharing can be a mixed blessing. There is an analogy to the Dutch disease
or 'resource curse' that has plagued many countries around the world
(Corden, 1984; Auty, 1993). An abundance of mineral wealth, received
rather quickly, can significantly improve the quality of life, as for example
is the case in Brunei (Reeks, 1998), but it also causes perverse local effects
that can retard longer term economic development. Most often cited are a
spending effect, where a greater share of domestic resources is allocated to
non-tractable sectors such as services and government, as well as the draw
ing of labor toward the higher paying mining sector and away from other
economic activity in the region. The former crowds out development of a
new export sector, whereas the latter drives up production costs in other
tractable sectors.
There are even less pleasant possibilities. One is that the new-found wealth
in resource rich districts may be squandered on ill-conceived projects. An
other is that the great amounts of money involved may stimulate corrupt
activities. Leite and Weidmann (1999) have argued that there is a positive
relationship between corruption and natural resource abundance, and that this
interplay retards economic growth.
W e have no evidence on these effects for Indonesian local governments,
but some would argue that their existence is a reasonable hypothesis. T he
introduction of natural resource revenue sharing in Indonesia surely produced
a windfall problem. Some local governments were overnight beneficiaries of
a new revenue sharing program, and the amounts received were in some cases
quite significant. We might estimate the magnitude and relative importance of
this windfall in the following way. We know that there was a 'hold harmless'
provision on DAU so that in 2001 it was approximately the same size as the
sum of the previous SDO and INPRES transfers in 2000. In Table 9.6, we
show the distribution of the ratio of natural resource transfers to DAU transfers.

,Ii
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Table 9.6

Ratio of natural resource revenue sharing to DAU transfers in
2001

Ratio

NRRS/DAU

0.10 or less
0.11-0.25
0.24-0.50
0.51-0.75
0.76-1.00
1.01-2.00
2.00 or more
Source:

268
24
14
2
5
13
10

Government of Indonesia: http://www.djpkpd.go.id

The larger this number, the larger the potential 'windfall' revenue from the
natural resource distribution to the district.
The results of our calculations show that several districts received quite
significant additions to the budget as a result of natural resource revenue
sharing. As shown in Table 9.6, while 268 districts received natural resource
revenue transfers that were less than 10 percent of their DAU transfers, 23
districts received amounts that were more than 100 percent of their DAU
allocation. This is evidence of a revenue increment significant enough to be
treated as a windfall. While some local officials may have recognized this
revenue sharing for what it was - repayment for natural resource exhaustion
- others almost certainly viewed it more as some would view a one-time
revenue bonanza.

POLICY OPTIONS AND CHOICES
As is clear from the above discussion so far, there are no easy or correct
answers regarding the 'right' way to share revenues raised from the taxation
of natural resources. Nevertheless, a few policy directions do seem clear:
•

There should be some sharing with the regions, if only because of the
need to reimburse for the costs of being the home of natural resource
activity. It may also be the case that national unity demands some
sharing of the returns from natural resource extraction.
• Central government is in the best position to tax natural resources,
since it possesses the major, appropriate instruments of taxation and
the tax administration advantages (McLure, 2000).

____.....
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Some other big questions are not so easily answered.
•
•
•
•
•

What is the correct division of revenues between central and local
governments (vertical sharing)?
How should the natural resource revenues be distributed among the
local governments (horizontal sharing)?
Should local governments be allowed to tax the extractive industries?
Are special, negotiated revenue sharing arrangements a good idea, or
should there be a national policy that applies to all the provinces?
If there is to be an allocation to local governments, should it carry
restrictions as to the object of expenditure? Are 'heritage fund' ar
rangements a feasible option for Indonesia?

In the following discussion, we try to address these questions.
The Correct Vertical Share?
There are any number of ways that one might choose the 'right level' of
vertical sharing of natural resource revenues. Either a bottom-up or a top
down approach could be used to determine the vertical share.
A bottom-up approach to determining the vertical share (VS) might be
described by the following:
VS=

CR+H+U
NRR

Ideally, the amount going to local governments would include a cost reim
bursement component (CR) and a 'heritage' component (H). The latter would
be compensation to recognize that an exhaustible natural resource, unique to
the region, was being used up and needed to be replaced with investment to
develop a new economic base. Another component in the calculation is the
opportunity cost of avoiding civil unrest or secession (U); that is, how much
of the natural resource revenue pie would it take to mitigate the call for
independence by some of the natural resource provinces? The denominator
would be total natural resource reserves (NRR). This ideal calculation is not
easily turned into a transparent policy because we do not know how to
calculate these amounts or even how to add them together to develop a
'vertical share.'
We might also consider a top-down approach to measuring the vertical
share, in which we might ask how much central government can afford to
share. One hypothesis is this that central government can afford to replace its
'excessive' reliance on natural resource taxes with an increase in domestic
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taxes. This increase could then be returned in the form of revenue sharing to
the natural resource regions. To make this case, and to measure the 'afford
able' vertical share, we must show two things: first, that mining sector taxes
have been substituted for other taxes, and second, that tax effort is low.
There is some evidence that Indonesia has substituted taxes on the natural
resource sector for taxes on the 'domestic sector.' We posit a structural relation
ship between oil tax revenues (OR) and non-oil tax revenues (NOR) as:
NOR= f(YP , PO, OR)
OR= F(PO, NOR),
where PO= price of oil. Using quarterly data and a two stage least squares
estimate, we find a negative relationship between 'domestic' tax revenues and
oil tax revenues (Table 9.7).
Table 9. 7 Regression analysis of oil revenue and non-oil revenue against
selected independent variables
Dependent variable
Intercept
GDRPpc
Oil price
Oil revenueb
Non-oil revenueb
Estimation method
Number of observations
Adj R2

I,

:[

I
I

I

Non-oil revenue•
9.31
(4.57)***
1.62 X 10-6
(1.02)
0.13
(0.23)
-0.49
(-1.12)

2SLS
67
0.13

Oil revenue•
9.70
(1.20)
0.35
(2.15)**
-1.06
(-1.76)*
2SLS
67
0.27

Notes:
***, **, * denote significance at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively;
\-statistics are shown in parentheses.
a As a percent of GDP.
Endogenous variable.
b
Sources: Quarterly per capita GDRP data are from the World Bank Indonesia Office. Oil
prices are from the Energy Information Administration: http://www.eia.doe.gov. Quarterly oil
and non-oil revenue data are drawn from government of Indonesia sources.
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The second question is whether the overall level of taxation is low in
Indonesia. Following the traditional method (Bahl, 1971), we estimate the
taxable capacity of Indonesia using two different specifications of functional
form, and the agricultural share of GDP and openness as independent vari
ables. By either of these equations, Indonesia is found to be a low taxing
country. Its estimated taxable capacity ranges between 19.6 and 19.9 percent
of GDP, both estimates being well above its actual level of taxation of 15.2
percent of GDP in 1998 and 12.7 percent in 2001. Let us suppose, ceteris
paribus, that Indonesia increased its level of tax effort to the international
average while not increasing its taxation of the natural resources sector. The
question we raise is the following: What share of natural resource revenue
would this free up for distribution to the local government sector?
We have simulated an implied vertical share using this 'affordability'
method, as reported in Table 9.8, for the late 1990s. For 1998, for example,
the actual tax ratio was 15.2 percent of GDP, so to reach the target of 19.9
percent of GDP, a revenue 'surplus' equivalent to 4.7 percent of GDP would
be created by some approach to increasing taxes to the international average.
In 1998, oil tax revenues were equivalent to 4.2 percent of GDP. If the total
amount of increased taxes were used to 'replace' oil revenues in the central
government general budget, the entitlement of local governments in oil rev
enue collections would have been 111.9 percent in 1998. That is, all oil tax
revenue collections would have been dedicated to the natural resource rev
enue sharing pool. During the 1994-99 period, the contribution would not
have dropped below 87.5 percent of oil tax revenue collections, though it
would have fluctuated widely. This is one view of a 'normative' vertical
share. By comparison, the actual level of natural resource revenue sharing in
Table 9.8

I
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Natural resource revenue sharing as a residual claim

Year

Actual tax ratio

Target

Surplus

Oil revenue

P otentiala

1994
1995
1996
1997
1998

16.0
15.8
14.5
15.0
15.2

19.9
19.9
19.9
19.9
19.9

3.9
4.1
5.4
4.9
4.7

3.5
2.9
3.7
5.6
4.2

111.4
144.3
145.9
87.5
111.9

Notes:
• Surplus as a percent of oil revenue.
All variables are shown as a share of GDP except 'Potential' in the far right column.
Sources: Government Finance Statistics Yearbook, International Monetary Fund and the
government of Indonesia sources.
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2001 was about 36 percent of oil tax revenues. One might conclude, using
this criterion, that the present vertical share is low.

Horizontal Sharing?
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Horizontal sharing refers to the distribution of natural resource revenues
among the districts. Unfortunately, there is no clear 'right' way to do horizon
tal distribution. As is suggested in Appendix A9.3, countries choose a wide
array of formula and derivation-type distributions. A 'derivation' approach
allocates revenues back to the local government where they were collected.
Some use ad hoc methods and others more transparent approaches. The
approach a country chooses depends on its economic and social objectives,
politics, history, and even an accident.
One set of questions to answer in designing a formula is whether the
revenues should be assigned exclusively to those places where the natural
resources were extracted, whether the formula should include local govern
ments subject to immediate spillover effects, whether it should include local
governments in general, or whether the sharing should be divided into pools
to reflect all of these groups.
One part of the answer should be straightforward: the sharing is meant to
compensate local governments both for the incremental costs of being home
to extractive industries and for the using up of an exhaustible resource. This
supports the argument that sharing should be on a derivation basis, and
should be allocated to the affected regions. Any general revenue sharing
should come under the general purpose transfer (DAU); that is, there is no
case for special natural resource revenue sharing if it is to be allocated to all
regions for general purposes.
However, allocation among local governments purely on a derivation basis
is no easy matter. For one thing, the incremental 'costs' of the extractive
activities may be borne in adjacent districts, as for example in the case of
road construction and maintenance, water and air pollution, and the like. In
other cases the ownership of the resource may not be clear. For example, the
well may be drilled in district A but it may tap a pool that 'belongs' to both
districts A and B. And then, there is the offshore issue. A more indirect effect
is that labor in the region may be drawn to the extractive sector by higher
wages, thereby siphoning off some of the productive labor in nearby districts
and driving up wage rates in general. These problems might have been more
easily handled in a world where provinces were major local government
players, in Indonesia. The decentralization of 2001 relegated the provinces to
a minor role in the intergovernmental fiscal system.
The solution to horizontal distribution that the Indonesian government
settled on in 2001 was a sort of rough proration. The system is based on a
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combination of derivation, formulae and ad hoc rules. While the rationale for
this horizontal sharing is not all that clear, there is at least some transparency.

Local Taxes and Charges?
Should local governments be allowed to tax the extractive sector? The simple
answer is that they should, but within the general framework for fiscal decen
tralization that Indonesia is now in process of designing and implementing.
The basic methods of taxing the extractive sector - personal and corporate
income taxes, VAT, trade taxes - should remain with central government, as
dictated by basic tax administration considerations.
Local governments could participate by raising fees and charges from the
extractive sector. However, this should be done within the general framework
of allowable local government revenue raising. Fees and charges should be
general levies on all businesses, and should be aimed at recouping some of
the cost of providing services. The targeting of one firm or one sector, for the
purpose of exporting burdens, should be prohibited.
Local governments could also be allowed to levy taxes on broader bases.
The property tax (PBB) is an appropriate local government tax. It is a levy on
the wealth held by the owners of a company, and at least part of the tax may
be borne locally. There is a good case for PBB revenues from the mining
sector to be shared with local governments.
Another possibility is for local government to participate in the payroll tax.
This power could be extended to all local governments in Indonesia, but
those with large shares of employment in the higher paying extractive sector
might benefit disproportionately. The tax revenue would belong to local
governments where the employment was located (rather than where the head
quarters firm was located). It could be levied as a piggyback tax where
central government sets the tax base and collects the tax, but the local govern
ment imposes a special tax rate (within some specified limit). This piggyback
income tax would be levied on all local firms and not just on those in the
mining sector. This levy could replace the 20 percent individual income tax
share that is now distributed as an intergovernmental transfer, on a derivation
basis.
Some policy analysts have concentrated on identifying taxes that can be
applied specifically to the natural resources sector. In an interesting analysis
of the options for local taxation of mining activities, Otto (2001) suggests
that good candidates might include royalties based on a unit assessment,
licensing fees, surface rentals or land use fees, stamp duties, property tax and
user fees. In terms of actual practice, he finds that property tax is the only
levy on this list that is commonly used. McKenzie (mimeograph) argues for
central taxing power over the natural resource sector as the most efficient
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solution, but allows that political realism may make the case for sub-national
government participation.

Special Autonomy?
Two Indonesian provinces, Aceh and West Papua, have negotiated a special
revenue sharing agreement with the central government, and some would see
merit in this approach. It certainly recognizes relevant differences as Aceh is
nearing the end of its natural resource (natural gas) dependent era, and West
Papua is in a much earlier stage of its exploitation of oil and minerals. Surely
the revenue sharing arrangements should be different? Another advantage of
negotiation is that it is bilateral and may be easier to bring to closure. To date,
a protracted debate in Parliament seems to have been avoided. 7
On the other hand, there are some major negatives to special revenue
sharing agreements:
•

•

•

I.

Special negotiations never end. One option is that they must be re
newed after a certain period of time. However, if a firm and binding
agreement is not made on the life of the contract, or is not recognized,
one of the parties will almost certainly try to renegotiate on a regular
basis. In that case, certainty in the distribution of natural resource
revenues will not have been gained, by either the central government
or the recipient local government.
Special negotiations encourage imitation, i.e. other provinces will seek
the same type of accommodation. Soon, every local government be
comes 'special' in terms of their expected revenue sharing. Local
governments will also imitate one another in terms of the tactics they
use to achieve a better agreement.
If there are no transparent rules that bind all local governments, then
there is no intergovernmental fiscal policy. Central government, as it
moves from negotiation to negotiation, will be making it up as they go.
This is not a desirable strategy. Each negotiation will set a new prec
edent, and the next local government will ask for at least as much as
the one before. The situation may not be any more satisfactory from
the point of view of local governments. They are in the early stages of
decentralization in Indonesia and may not have the skills to bargain
well in the early rounds, or their bargaining table may have been
captured by local elites who do not speak in the best interest of the
local population.
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Heritage Fund?
One of the primary goals of natural resource revenue sharing should be to
finance the replacement of an exhaustible resource with an alternative,
sustainable economic base. In theory, the benefits of the program should
accrue to present and future residents. However, the current system of
natural resource revenue sharing in Indonesia all but guarantees that there
will be no intergenerational transfer. Local politicians and other local elites
will have a decided bias in favor of spending the money to benefit current
voters or the current power structures. Though there has not yet been a
thorough monitoring of these expenditures, many believe that much of the
money has been squandered. This is a result that one might expect in the
case of receipt of a large revenue windfall with little accountability to
voters and little transparency.
A way around this 'windfall' problem is the creation of a heritage fund as
the central mechanism for administering natural resource revenue sharing.
The system might work as follows:

,Ir
!

•

The overall vertical share for natural resource revenue sharing would
be a proportion of natural resource revenues, while the horizontal share
would be according to some transparent method.
• Payments into the heritage fund would be prescribed as a percent of
the natural resource revenue sharing allocation. 8 Each local govern
ment would have an account.
• Annual and full payments to the heritage fund would be guaranteed.
• Expenditures from the fund would be earmarked for 'pre-approved'
development projects. For those districts receiving small amounts, the
natural resource transfer could be seen as augmenting conditional grants.
In effect, the money would be used for hard and soft infrastructure
projects that are consistent with a structural adjustment of the local
economic base.
• Management of the heritage fund could be by an independent third
party. Alternatively, payments to the fund could be treated as a dedi
cated revenue stream of payments to a sinking fund to service and
repay a foreign loan. The lender would manage the sinking fund to
accommodate the erratic revenue flow resulting from fluctuating oil
and mineral prices, and could pre-fund certain projects. The dedication
of a revenue stream from natural resources should defray both collat
eral concerns and foreign exchange risk.
The heritage fund concept has great merit as a policy for Indonesia. It at
once addresses the revenue instability and windfall issues, and it also makes
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possible an intergenerational transfer because it is earmarked for a capital
project. Some governments have been successful with the management of oil
and mining stabilization funds (Alsaka, Norway, Chile), but a key to success
seems to be the degree to which the government has a history of practicing
fiscal discipline (Fasano, 2000). Whether such a fund could succeed in Indo
nesia is an open and interesting question.

CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

I

I'

The sharing of natural resource revenues with local governments in Indonesia
would seem unavoidable. It would also seem fair and efficient. Local govern
ments incur a variety of private and social costs associated with natural
resource extraction, they should be compensated for exhaustion of the re
source, and there are political economy questions about the costs of civil
unrest. The question would not seem to be whether there should be sharing of
these revenues. Rather, the questions are 'how much sharing?' and 'how
should it be done?'
Perhaps the most difficult question relates to the appropriate vertical share:
how much of the shared revenue should belong to the center and how much
should belong to the local governments? It would not seem possible to make
a precise, direct calculation of the costs based on the factors that dictate
revenue sharing. What should be done?
One option would be to let the government and the regions negotiate a
general agreement, as was done in setting up the present arrangement. The
basis for calculating the vertical share should be the best estimates that one
can make of the 'costs' of natural resource extraction, and a calculation of a
'heritage' amount. This would move the decision towards a different vertical
share for each region, as would individual negotiations.
There is no perfect way to calculate the 'heritage' compensation, or even
the cost reimbursement amounts. However, hard analysis can significantly
reduce the subjectivity in assigning the vertical (and horizontal) shares. One
feasible option would be to appoint a high-level 'grants' commission to carry
out the work and design a five-year 'contract' to recommend to the President
and to Parliament.
A second option would be to let central government adopt an affordability
approach, in which it raises tax effort to the international average (or com
putes what this amount would be) and then uses that 'surplus' to free up
resources for a greater allocation of natural resource revenues to the regions.
At 1998-99 levels, this would have resulted in a devolution of natural re
source revenues of about 2.2 percent of GDP, which is above the present level
of about 0.6 percent of GDP.
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Once a method is in place for establishing the size of the vertical share
(and horizontal share), one might take on the four questions that seem to
plague the formation of a firm intergovernmental policy for natural resources.
1.

2.

3.

«b

Should the natural resource revenue sharing regime be linked to the
general purpose grant program of the government (the DAU)? On a
conceptual level, there is a strong argument that these two revenue shar
ing flows should not be linked as the transfers are for entirely different
purposes. The DAU is to cover the minimum costs of local government
provision of a decentralized set of expenditure responsibilities. Essential
services, in natural resource regions and in other regions, should con
tinue to be financed by DAU and local resources. Natural resource revenue
sharing should be seen as an earmarked, conditional transfer. The pur
pose is to compensate local governments for the additional costs associated
with natural resource activity, and for the 'exhausted' economic base of
the region. So long as its use is formally limited to these purposes, it
should not be seen as an enhancement of the general fiscal capacity of
the district government. It is no more an addition to the ability to finance
local government services than is an earmarked conditional grant. It
would be incorrect to deduct revenues from natural resource transfers ( or
other conditional transfers) from DAU entitlements.
In fact, however, many policy analysts advocate deducting natural
resource transfer from DAU allocations, on grounds that these are an
enhancement to fiscal capacity. In the case of Indonesia, such deduction
was actually built into the original formula. However, this is based on the
presumption that natural resource sharing is no more than a second,
general purpose transfer, and is being used for financing recurrent expen
ditures. If there is no special purpose justification for natural resource
revenue sharing, why not simply combine it with DAU?
Should the natural resource revenue sharing system be based on a trans
parent formula (as for example, determination by a grants commission)
or should it be negotiated on a province-by-province basis? While nego
tiation seems to have had the advantage of being more quickly and more
easily accomplished, it is not a good long-run solution. It invites contin
ued re-contracting, it is not transparent, it favors better negotiators and
local governments that are in a stronger political position, and it is the
antithesis of the development of a coherent government policy on inter
governmental fiscal relations. A better approach would be to allow a
grants commission to factor 'special circumstances' into the allocation
criteria.
Should local governments be able to tax the natural resource sector? One
answer is that the center should lay down taxing and tax sharing rules for
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4.

all local governments in the country. Local governments with a strong
mining sector should follow these general rules in the same way as local
governments with strong manufacturing or tourism or agricultural sec
tors. Fees, charges and some form of sharing of local payroll taxes and
property taxes are good candidates for local revenue raising. No special
local taxes on the extractive sector should be allowed.
How does one deal with the twin problems of (a) unwise use of windfall
revenues to local governments with large mining sectors, and (b) the
revenue financing of essential local services with an unstable flow from
natural resource industries? Local governments would seem ill-equipped
to handle the lumpy revenue flows from natural resource revenue shar
ing. One solution to this problem is the creation of a heritage fund
arrangement, which could be used to finance development expenditures
that would produce benefits for the present and future generation. Pay
ments into the heritage fund (or a sinking fund) could fluctuate with
commodity prices without harming the provision of these programs. The
fund could be conservatively managed by an outside, third party.

NOTES
1. The GDP category 'mining and quarrying' includes crude petroleum and natural gas pro
duction, and coal, metal ore and other mining.
2. Expected and actual levels of expenditure decentralization are reported in Appendix A9.2.
3. The one government paper that we did find that explicitly discusses and researches the
topic of natural resource revenue sharing in Indonesia is BAPPENAS (2000).
4. The GDP category 'mining and quarrying' includes crude petroleum and natural gas pro
duction, and coal, metal ore and other mining.
5. We omitted 37 countries because data for all variables were not available. These countries
have an average mining share of 8.2 percent, compared to the sample average of 7.8
percent.
6. Expected and actual levels of expenditure decentralization are reported in Appendix A9.2.
7. Herbst (2001, p. 5) makes the interesting point that Russia allocated resources among
regions on an ad hoc basis largely to hold the federation together, but that 'if such systems
of ad hoc allocations continue indefinitely, countries may not go beyond crisis manage
ment.'
8. The remainder would be to reimburse the incremental costs of natural resource extraction.
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APPENDIXA9.1

Country name
United Arab Emirates
Nigeria
Botswana
Kuwait
Saudi Arabia
Ukraine
Mongolia
Bulgaria
Macedonia, FYR
Algeria
Kazakhstan
Azerbaijan
Portugal
Costa Rica
Lithuania
Venezuela
Bahrain
Trinidad and Tobago
Croatia
Papua New Guinea
Iran, Islamic Rep.
Israel
Yemen,Rep.
Namibia
Norway
Ecuador
Guyana
Romania
Indonesia

Sierra Leone
Moldova
Chile
Bolivia
Colombia
South Africa
Sudan
Tunisia
Jordan
Australia
Suriname

SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS
(COUNTRIES RANKED BY THE SIZE
OF MINING SECTOR IN GDP*)
Mining•
46.7
35.7
35.6
35.5
35.4
34.6
29.1
28.2
27.6
27.3
25.9
24.7
24.2
19.4
18.4
18.3
17.8
16.5
16.0
15.8
14.2
14.0
13.3
13.1
12.9
12.3
11.6
11.1

10.1

9.4
8.5
8.5
8.4
8.2
7.7
5.9
5.3
4.6
4.0
3.8

Tax
Decentralizationb ratio c

Revenue Mining/
ratio d sub. exp.0

28.9
4.8

7.8
33.8

28.9
35.1
18.1

37.0
24.2
33.1

30.1
42.4

37.0
24.1
11.2
3.0
26.2

14.5
22.4
32.6
21.2
30.1

23.0
23.1
36.6
20.6
32.2

2.9
4.4
10.8

23.2
44.6

28.1
29.3
48.5

0.0
13.6

7.2
35.3

42.3

32.4

30.2
40.9

52.9

11.6

12.2

27.9
8.0
23.4
43.5
29.1

42.4

30.3

198.5

34.6

21.4
2612.2

220.3
98.6
0.6

0.8

18.2

43.3

37.2
24.7
20.7

33.9
12.1

27.7
6.3

29.3

5.2

28.8

34.4

2.2

15.8

11.2
26.2
19.6
14.5

I I
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Country name
Canada
Dominican Republic
Kyrgyz Republic
Bahamas, The
Malta
Netherlands
Bhutan
United Kingdom
Morocco
India
Peru
Czech Republic
Estonia
United States
Georgia
Honduras
Mali
Mexico
Brazil
Swaziland
Thailand
New Zealand
Turkey
Sri Lanka
Greece
Philippines
Slovak Republic
Denmark
Burundi
Belize
Senegal
Myanmar
Pakistan
Spain
Nepal
France
Austria
El Salvador
Korea, Rep.
Paraguay
Finland
Cyprus

(continued)
Mining•
3.5
3.5
3.2
3.2
3.1
2.9
2.2
2.1
2.1
2.0
1.9
1.8
1.6
1.6
1.6
1.6
1.5
1.5
1.5
1.5
1.4
1.4
1.3
1.2
1.1
1.1
1.0
0.8
0.8
0.6
0.6
0.6
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.4
0.4
0.4
0.4
0.4
0.4
0.3

Decentralizationb

Tax
ratioc

22.8

37.3
13.5
14.0
15.6
26.8
43.0
6.1
35.4

45.5
18.9
20.6
25.2
46.3
20.0

14.5
12.8
38.5
34.8
28.0
8.2

1.4
26.1
39.2
1.8
8.0
10.1

10.7
16.7
27.2
29.7
17.2
36.7
24.4
17.3
32.1

57.4
2.3
25.5
24.0

9.1
7.9
7.9
8.9
44.4

38.6
48.6
15.2

Revenue Mining/
sub. exp.°
ratiod
45.5
15.0

1.0
78.3

50.4

1.7

39.2

1.9

19.2
17.0
41.6
38.4
33.4

1.4
13.9

19.3
39.7

3.0
0.7

19.4

8.3
3.7

39.8
56.8

1.4
0.8

8.7
2.6
0.4

5.5

14.9

29.2
30.6

33.6

35.4

17.6
30.9

43.0
42.4

46.5
49.1

0.7
0.2

45.6
2.8
35.9

20.9
9.4
38.5

13.3
46.5

0.1
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Country name
St Vincent and the
Grenadines
Sweden
Ethiopia
Japan
Cote d'Ivoire
Kenya
Uruguay
Cambodia
Latvia
Panama
Lesotho
Mauritius
Puerto Rico
Singapore
Hong Kong, China
Gambia, The
Bangladesh
Seychelles
Mean
Median
Variance

Mining•

Decentralizationb

Tax
ratioc
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Revenue Mining/
ratiod sub. exp.<

0.3
0.3
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
7.8
1.9
116.8

0.1

33.8
1.5
60.6
3.2
4.1
10.3

51.7
10.4
28.1
16.7
22.6

57.2

24.0
2.5

32.7
18.6
39.2
19.2

38.6
27.1

0.2
2.5

22.0

1.1

4.6

0.5

16.3
19.9
39.8
34.4
20.6
20.0
237.3

25.5
26.2
131.9

33.8
34.5
143.0

Notes:

*
•
b

c
d

The data are the average of 1990-99.
Share of mining and quarrying in GDP. Mining and quarrying include crude petroleum and
natural gas production, coal, metal ore and other minings.
Sub-national government share of total government expenditures.
Ratio of total government tax revenues over GDP.
Total government revenue over GDP
10 percent of mining GDP over sub-national government expenditure(%)

Sources: Mining data are from National Accounts Statistics, The United Nations; tax, rev
enue, expenditure data are from Government Finance Statistics Yearbook, International Monetary
Fund.
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FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION EFFORT

Decentralization•

Australia
Austria
Azerbaijan
Bahrain
Bolivia
Botswana
Brazil
Bulgaria
Canada
Chile
Colombia
Costa Rica
Cote d'Ivoire
Croatia
Czech Republic
Denmark
Dominican Republic
Estonia
Ethiopia
Finland
France
Georgia
Greece
India
Indonesia
Israel
Japan
Kazakhstan
Kenya
Korea, Rep.
Kyrgyz Republic
Latvia
Lithuania
Mali
Mauritius
Mexico
Moldova

42.4
30.9
24.1
2.9
23.4
4.8
39.2
18.1
57.4
8.0
43.5
3.0
3.2
10.8
20.6
44.4
2.3
25.2
1.5
35.9
17.6
20.0
7.9
45.5
12.2
13.6
60.6
37.0
4.1
45.6
25.5
24.0
26.2
1.4
4.6
26.1
27.9

Expected
decentralizationb

Decentralization
effortc

43.1
17.7
9.3
6.8
12.2
14.8
36.9
13.1
47.6
21.6
22.7
12.1
7.0
13.1
13.1
17.3
9.0
7.4
6.0
18.0
32.5
5.2
16.9
23.5
26.6
18.3
38.1
21.6
6.7
18.4
8.2
5.6
11.0
7.1
3.4
25.8
7.4

1.0
1.7
2.6
0.4
1.9
0.3

1.1
1.4
1.2
0.4
1.9
0.2
0.5
0.8
1.6
2.6
0.3
3.4
0.3
2.0
0.5
3.8
0.5
1.9
0.5
0.7
1.6
1.7
0.6
2.5
3.1
4.3
2.4
0.2
1.4
1.0
3.8
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Country

Decentralizationa

Mongolia
Netherlands
New Zealand
Nigeria
Norway
Pakistan
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Philippines
Portugal
Romania
Senegal
Slovak Republic
South Africa
Spain
Sri Lanka
Swaziland
Sweden
Thailand
Trinidad and Tobago
Ukraine
United Kingdom
United States
Uruguay

35.1
24.0
10.1
28.9
32.4
29.2
2.5
2.8
18.9
7.9
11.2
11.6
5.5
8.9
29.1
30.6
9.1
1.8
33.8
8.0
4.4
28.9
22.8
46.3
10.3

Expected
decentralizationb

Decentralization
effoftC

9.5
23.6
16.9
17.2
30.2
12.0
6.1
8.1
16.8
13.3
23.9
15.1
6.2
9.1
26.8
25.5
7.5
4.4
20.2
18.5
8.0
22.4
32.9
74.5
8.7

3.7
1.0
0.6
1.7
1.1
2.4
0.4
0.3
1.1
0.6
0.5
0.8
0.9
1.0
1.1
1.2
1.2
0.4
1.7
0.4
0.6
1.3
0.7
0.6
1.2

Notes:
•

b
c
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Defined as the ratio of sub-national to total government expenditure. Data are an average for
the I 990---99 period.
Estimates are based on equation shown in Table 9.2.
Ratio of actual to estimated expenditure decentralization.

Source:

I

Government Finance Statistics Yearbook, 2001, International Monetary Fund.
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APPENDIX A9.3
Country
Brazil

N

�

States:
Local:

--------

- --

NATURAL RESOURCE REVENUE SHARING PRACTICES
Vertical share

Distribution criteria

Taxes on minerals (45%)
Tax on gold (70%)
2.3% of revenues from
crude oil production
Taxes on minerals (50%)

Origin
Origin
Origin
Origin
For each province, the center determines what share of the tax
revenues it collects that province may retain. T he determination
is made on the basis of a combination of derivation, formula,
and negotiations and ad hoc decisions

China

Provinces:

Taxes on natural resources

Estoma

Local:

Taxes on oil sale (50%)
Taxes on construction material (70%)
Water supply tax (80%)

Indonesia

Provinces:

Royalties on oil and gas
sales, royalties on forestry
and mining activities

Derivation: forest royalties: 65% federal (F), 35% state (S) and
local (L), (28% S, 7% L); mining royalties: 30% F, 70% S and L
(56% S, 14% L)

Import and excise duties on oil (30%
to states)
Export duty on tin (10% to states)
Export duties on other minerals

Derivation

Malaysia

Export duties on timber
and other forest products

Derivation (exclusively for the states of Sabah and Sarawak, which
were granted special privileges as a condition for joining the
federation)

Mexico

States:

Nigeria
States:
Local:

""
""

Import taxes and
petroleum export duties
Most revenues collected centrally
into Federation Account (FA); 73%
of government revenue is oil-based
States Joint Account (SJA) 31.5% of
FA.
IO% of FA
Population (75%)

Shared with petroleum refining and exporting cities (derivation)

5% of SJA distributed to mineral producing states on the basis of
derivation
Equal share (25%)

Pakistan

Provinces:

80% of excise duty and royalty on
natural gas, surcharge on gas;
royalty on crude oil and profits on
hydroelectricity

Origin

Papua New
Guinea

Provinces:

Royalties: mineral and petroleum,
natural gas, timber, and fish

Derivation

Tax on petroleum products

Derivation

Philippines
Russia

Provinces:
Local:

Natural resource taxes (39%)
Natural resource taxes (36%)

The source for Pakistan is The World Bank (2000); the source for Estonia is The World Bank (1995); the source for Russia is Frienkman and
Yossifov (1999); the source for all other countries is Shah (1994).

Sources:
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